Roger K. Eggett, Jr. v. Wasatch Energy Corporation : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Roger K. Eggett, Jr. v. Wasatch Energy Corporation
: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Perrin R. Love; Clyde, Snow, Sessions and Swenson; Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Eric C. Olsen; Merrill F. Nelson; Kirton and McConkie; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Eggett, Jr. v. Wasatch Energy Corporation, No. 20000079 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2605
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER K. EGGETT, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20000079-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Final Judgment of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Judge David S. Young 
Perrin R. Love 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & 
SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee 
Eric C. Olson (A4108) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Utah Court of Appeals 
SEP 2 5 2000 
Pautette Stagg 
Cleric of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER K. EGGETT, JR., an individual, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WASATCH ENERGY CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20000079-CA 
Priority No. 15 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Final Judgment of the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Judge David S. Young 
Perrin R. Love 
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & 
SWENSON 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
Eric C. Olson (A4108) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1004 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
INTRODUCTION 1 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING BOOK VALUE | 
ADJUSTMENTS INSTEAD OF DIRECTING THE VERDICT AT THE 
VALUE ESTABLISHED IN THE AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
A. Eggett's Adjustments Were Presented to Increase Book Value. 3 
B. Wasatch Was Entitled To A Directed Verdict On Book Value 5 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALTERING A JURY VERDICT THAT 
WAS CLEAR ON ITS FACE AND NOT SUBJECT TO CORRECTION. . 7 
A. The Jury Verdict Was Clear On Its Face 8 
B. Rule 47(r) Does Not Authorize Alteration of the Verdict 12 
C. The Trial Court's Error Was Not "Harmless." 17 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES FOR 
CLAIMS NOT COVERED BY THE ATTORNEY FEE PROVISION.... 21 
CONCLUSION 22 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Area, Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 
541 P.2d 755 (Alas. 1975) 5-7 
Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 
752 P.2d 1317 (Utah App. 1988) 19 
Brown v. Johnson, 
All P.2d 942 (Utah 1970) 15, 16 
Brown v. Richards, 
840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992) 7 
Cambelt Int 7 Corp. v. Dalton, 
745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987) 2 
Cohn v. J.C Penney Co., 
537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975) 15 
Cooper v. Evans, 
262 P.2d 278 (Utah 1953) 10, 19 
Crowder Constr. Co. v. Kiser, 
517 S.E.2d 178 (N.C. App. 1999) 5, 7 
Crowe v. Sacks, 
283 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1955) 13, 14, 16, 17 
Dalton v. Jerico Constr. Co., 
642 P.2d 748 (Utah 1982) 7 
EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 
412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966) 11 
First Security Bank v. Ezra C Lundahl, Inc., 
454 P.2d 886 (Utah 1969) 11 
ii 
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 
667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) 12, 18, 19 
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 
152 P. 726 (Utah 1915) 12 
Jones v. Harris, 
388 P.2d 539 (Wash. 1964) 6 
Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 
383 P.2d 934 (Utah 1963) 14, 16 
Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 
491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1971) 15-17 
Merino v. Albert sons, Inc., 
1999 UT 14, 975 P.2d 467 7 
State ex rel. Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 
842 P.2d 383 (Or. 1992) 16 
State v. Gee, 
498 P.2d 662 (Utah 1972) 19 
Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508 15, 17 
Swecker v. Rau, 
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3301 (D. Pa. 1990) 5 
Ute-Cal Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 
605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980) 15 
Webb v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 
804 P.2d 547 (Utah App. 1991) 7 
111 
Statutes and Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 47(q) 10 
Rule 47(r) 12-16 
Rule 49(a) 12 
Rule 50(a) 7 
Rule 61 21 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 606(b) 11, 12, 17 
IV 
INTRODUCTION 
The central issue of this appeal is the book value of Roger Eggett's stock. 
However, substantial portions of Eggett's response brief address his compensation, his 
termination, and Wasatch Energy's supposed bad faith, none of which is at issue on this 
appeal. Wasatch does not contest those portions of the jury verdict pertaining to 
compensation and termination, and the verdict does not rest on, or even mention, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Liability under the verdict is based entirely on 
the Shareholders' Agreement. Wasatch does not dispute that it owes Eggett the book 
value of his stock. The only issue is how that book value should be determined. 
Under the undisputed terms of the Shareholders' Agreement, Eggett agreed that 
the book value established in the Company's audited financial statement would be 
"binding and conclusive" on the parties. (Add. 28.) That audited financial statement set 
the book value of Eggett's stock at $27,540. (Add. 63; 36.5 percent of total stockholders' 
equity.) Over the objections of Wasatch counsel, Eggett was permitted to make 
"adjustments" to total stockholders' equity in order to increase the book value of his own 
stock. Based on those adjustments, the jury verdict set the book value of Eggett's stock at 
$49,520. (Add. 8; 36.5 percent of Company book value, found by the jury to be 
$135,671.96.) Judge David Young, believing that verdict figure to be low, then altered 
the special verdict question to award Eggett the full $135,671.96 as the book value of his 
own stock. (Tr. 989-94.) 
Wasatch has demonstrated in its opening brief that Eggett is bound by the book 
value of $27,540, as established in the audited financial statement. Judge Young erred in 
admitting Eggett's adjustments to Company book value and, accordingly, in refusing to 
direct the verdict in that agreed amount of $27,540. (Br. of App. 13-21.) Alternatively, 
Eggett and Judge Young were bound by the book value of $49,520, as established by the 
jury verdict. Judge Young erred in altering the special verdict question to increase the 
verdict to $135,672. (Br. of App. 21-34.) In addition, the district court erred in awarding 
Eggett attorney fees for work on the employment and bad faith claims, for which fees are 
not recoverable. (Br. of App. 35-37.) 
ARGUMENT 
As a preface to discussion of legal arguments, correction is required on certain 
preliminary matters. First, Eggett asserts an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. (Br. 
of Aplee. 1-2.) However, the district court has no discretion to ignore the provisions of a 
binding contract, to alter a jury verdict that is clear on its face, or to award attorney fees 
on claims for which fees are not recoverable. Those are all matters of law reviewed for 
correctness. (Br. of App. 1-2.) Second, Eggett asserts that Wasatch failed to marshal 
facts supporting the verdict. (Br. of Aplee. 4.) However, the marshaling requirement 
applies only when challenging the sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. E.g., 
Cambelt Infl Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1987). Here, Wasatch does not 
challenge the jury's verdict, but only seeks to enforce it as rendered on the verdict form. 
Finally, Eggett refers repeatedly to supposed bad faith and challenges Wasatch's failure 
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to discuss the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (Br. of Aplee. 7-13.) However, the 
jury verdict was based solely on the contractual obligation to pay Eggett the book value 
of his stock. The special verdict does not even mention bad faith or the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing. In fact, the jury expressly found that Wasatch's conduct was not 
willful, malicious, reckless, intentional, or fraudulent. (Special Verdict, Question 6, Add. 
8-9.) 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING BOOK VALUE 
ADJUSTMENTS INSTEAD OF DIRECTING THE VERDICT AT 
THE VALUE ESTABLISHED IN THE AUDITED FINANCIAL 
STATEMENT. 
In its opening brief, Wasatch demonstrated that Eggett is bound by the terms of the 
Shareholders' Agreement, which makes the book value in the audited financial statement 
"binding and conclusive upon the parties." (Para. 18(d), Add. 28.) Based on this contract 
provision, the trial court erred by refusing to direct the verdict at that audited book value 
and instead permitting Eggett to offer "adjustments" to book value. (Br. of App. 13-21.) 
A, Eggett's Adjustments Were Presented to Increase Book Value. 
Eggett does not dispute that the parol evidence rule prohibits his book value 
adjustments for the purpose of circumventing the "book value" definition in the 
Shareholders' Agreement. Rather, he argues that his book value adjustments were 
admitted only to prove bad faith, not to circumvent the contract. (Br. of Aplee. 15-22.) 
However, this argument is transparently disingenuous. Eggett's book value adjustments 
were presented for the clear purpose of increasing Company book value above the figure 
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established in the audited financial statement. By increasing Company book value, 
Eggett would increase the value of his own stock. While Eggett alleged breach of the 
covenant of good faith, he sought no separate recovery under that theory at trial. (See 
Special Verdict form.) Therefore, the only application of the adjustments was to increase 
the book value of his stock. 
The record plainly shows that Eggett's purpose in adjusting Company book value 
was to increase his own book value. In his pretrial motion to compel discovery of the 
adjustments, Eggett's counsel affirmed: "This information is necessary to calculate the 
book value of Eggett's shares " (R. 117.) At trial, in opposing Wasatch's motion in 
limine to exclude evidence of adjustments to book value, Eggett's counsel argued that the 
adjustments were relevant "in establishing book value of [Eggett's] shares" and should be 
"considered in determination of book value." (Tr. 10.) Most importantly, Eggett 
presented the adjustments at trial in the context of testifying on Company and personal 
book value. (Tr. 255-89, 888-94.) Eggett's own trial exhibit shows that these 
adjustments were intended and used to increase Company book value from the audited 
figure of $75,452 to the fictitious figure of nearly $700,000. (Add. 52-53.) With these 
adjustments, Eggett's own claimed book value skyrocketed by nearly ten times from 
$27,540 to $255,419. (Id.) Accordingly, Eggett's assertion that these adjustments were 
introduced and intended solely to prove bad faith is inherently incredible. 
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B. Wasatch Was Entitled To A Directed Verdict On Book Value. 
In any event, Eggett's attempt to relegate this argument to a mere evidentiary 
dispute "misses the point." The purpose and effect of excluding Eggett's book value 
adjustments was to obtain a directed verdict at the book value established in the audited 
financial statement. Even if evidence of Eggett's adjustments to Company book value 
were relevant to prove bad faith, the trial court still erred in refusing to direct the verdict 
on the book value of Eggett's stock. 
The Shareholders' Agreement plainly defined book value for departing 
shareholders as the net shareholders' equity set forth in the Company's year-end audited 
financial statement. (Add. 28.) By signing that agreement, Eggett assumed the risk that 
the audited statement could be prepared contrary to his own judgment. See Crowder 
Constr. Co. v. Riser, 517 S.E.2d 178, 188 (N.C. App. 1999) (mere differences in 
accounting methods or judgment do not justify disregard of audited book value); Area, 
Inc. v. Stentenfeld, 541 P.2d 755, 764 (Alas. 1975) ("technical variations" in determining 
book value "cannot per se be deemed fatal errors"). Eggett made no allegation in his 
complaint, and presented no proof, that the audited statement was not prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, or that it contained 
I 
mathematical errors, or that it resulted from any fraudulent or intentional act. Therefore, 
book value as established in the audited statement must be accepted and enforced as a 
matter of law. E.g., Crowder Constr. Co.} supra, at 195 (granting summary judgment to 
former employer on stock-valuation claim); Swecker v. Rau, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3301 
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(D. Pa. 1990) (granting summary judgment on "book value" of stock); Area, Inc. v. 
Stetenfeld, supra, at 764 ("as a matter of law the term 'book value5 has no fixed meaning, 
the intent and understanding of the parties to the individual agreement must control"); 
Jones v. Harris, 388 P.2d 539, 542 (Wash. 1964) (parties are "bound" by "book value" as 
defined by agreement and contained in financial statements). 
At the close of evidence, Wasatch counsel moved for directed verdict on the book 
value of Company stock, requesting that book value be decided as a matter of law, not by 
the jury: 
Your honor, this is my motion for a partial dispositive ruling at the 
conclusion of the evidence. The ruling I'm asking for with regard to the 
value of shares and book value I think Mr. Eggett testified that he 
understood it to be a June 30 date that was intended and we agreed with 
that. We have an audited statement that has specific dates. The agreement 
requires that it be the audited statement from the auditors and the accrual 
and general accepted accounting practices and such. Therefore, we feel that 
that is the number that should be in here and that should not be left to the 
jury. [Tr. 907, emp. added.] 
The trial court denied the motion, as follows: 
I believe that the plaintiff should have the opportunity to present 
adjustments to that statement. He's not going to be specifically bound to 
the audited statement of June 30 . . . . [H]e should be allowed to challenge 
that and show that reasonable adjustments should be made to the financial 
statements as then audited because of the, let's say, bias that had been 
incorporated by discretionary calls of the officers. 
. . . It just seems to me that it would be inequitable to require him to 
simply accept an audited statement when that audited statement was 
prepared after the time that he had been terminated [Tr. 908-09, emp. 
added.] 
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Thus, the trial court ruled directly contrary to the law, as set forth above and in 
Wasatch's opening brief. (Br. of App. 13-18.) The court erroneously released Eggett 
from his binding contract "on the basis of supposed equitable principles." See Dalton v. 
Jerico Constr. Co., 642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982). The court erroneously admitted 
extrinsic evidence to vary and circumvent the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement. See 
Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 148 (Utah App. 1992); Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 
804 P.2d 547, 551-52 (Utah App. 1991). And the court erroneously rejected the book 
value of Company stock as set forth in the audited financial statement. Mere "bias" or 
differences of judgment are inherent in accounting records and present no legal basis to 
disregard them. See Crowder Constr. and Area, Inc., supra. "Bias" is not the equivalent 
of fraud or bad faith, as Eggett argues. (Br. of Aplee. 26.) Accordingly, this Court 
should reverse the trial court's denial of Wasatch's motion for directed verdict and enter 
judgment for the agreed book value of Eggett's stock in the amount of $27,540. See Rule 
50(a); Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, 975 P.2d 467, 468 (reversing denial of 
defendant's motion for directed verdict). 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALTERING A JURY VERDICT 
THAT WAS CLEAR ON ITS FACE AND NOT SUBJECT TO 
CORRECTION. 
Alternatively, Wasatch demonstrated in its opening brief that it is entitled by 
constitution, statute, and rule to a jury determination of book value; that verdict questions 
considered confusing or ambiguous must be corrected before submission to the jury, or be 
deemed waived; and that the trial court has no authority to alter a clear jury verdict 
simply because he may disagree with it. (Br. of App. 21-25.) Eggett does not dispute 
these legal principles. Rather, he argues only that the verdict was unclear and that the 
trial court was authorized to question the jury to "clarify" its intent. (Br. of Aplee. 26-
40.) However, Eggett's argument fails in its premise because the verdict was not unclear, 
therefore, the court had no authority to probe the jury and alter the written verdict. 
A. The Jury Verdict Was Clear On Its Face. 
The context and wording of Special Verdict Question 5 leave no question of its 
meaning. The primary issue of the case, the only issue aside from compensation (which 
is not in dispute), was the book value of Eggett's stock. Regarding the method to 
calculate his book value, Eggett testified: 
Q . . . Can you tell the jury how book value is to be calculated? 
A . . . [Y]ou take the equity of the company and you multiply it by 
my ownership interest, which was 36 /4%, so we have to determine the 
amount of ownership equity that was in the company. [Tr. 256, emp. 
added.] 
Eggett's own trial exhibits followed this same formula, first determining total Company 
book value, and then multiplying that value by 36.5 percent to derive Eggett's book value. 
(Add. 51, 53.) Following that formula, Special Verdict Question 5 naturally asks the jury 
for the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy." (Add. 8.) The question plainly does not ask 
for the book value of Eggett's stock. Eggett's counsel apparently approved the question, 
and neither counsel nor the court voiced any objection or question concerning its meaning 
when the court read the verdict form to the jury prior to submission. (Tr. 927.) The clear 
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understanding and intent of both counsel was to calculate Eggett's book value, after 
receiving the verdict, by multiplying the jury's verdict of Company book value by 36.5 
percent. 
Accordingly, on its face, as well as in context of the evidence, Special Verdict 
Question 5 is clear and unambiguous. It asks in plain, simple terms for "'the book value5 
of Wasatch Energy" (emp. added), not for the amount due Eggett. Neither does the jury's 
response create any ambiguity. The answer of "$135,671.96" is well within the range of 
evidence presented by the parties. Wasatch demonstrated Company book value of 
$75,452, as set forth in the audited financial statement (Add. 63; Tr. 573, 669), while 
Eggett argued for an adjusted Company book value of $699,778 (Add. 53). Based on the 
clear, unambiguous question and the jury's clear and rational response, Judge Young had 
no basis to alter the question to reach a different result. In short, nothing about the 
question or the response indicated a "possible mistake" or required "clarification." 
Still, Eggett argues that the jury's answer to Question 5 had "two possible 
interpretations" and that the court merely "polled the jurors" to clarify their intent. (Br. of 
Aplee. 32, 27.) However, on the face of the verdict there was only one possible 
interpretation, that $135,672 was "the 'book value' of Wasatch Energy" (emp. added), 
just as the question plainly states. The percentage of that amount owed to Eggett was not 
on the verdict form because it was stipulated to be 36.5 percent of Company book value, 
an amount to be calculated later based on the jury verdict. It makes no difference that 
"[t]he jury was not told or instructed" that Eggett's share would be derived from the 
jury's finding of Company book value. (Br. of Aplee. 36.) Jury's are not required to 
understand the legal significance of their factual determinations. E.g., Cooper v. Evans, 
262 P.2d 278, 279, 281 (Utah 1953) (jury finding of contributory negligence was valid 
although jury was "disappointed with the result" and "may not have understood the full 
legal consequences of their findings"). 
Neither did Judge Young "poll" the jury. A jury is "polled," at the request of 
either party, by "asking each juror if [the answer on the verdict form] is his verdict." 
Rule 47(q). Here, neither party requested that the jury be polled, and Judge Young never 
asked the jury if the answer to Question 5 was their verdict. Instead, he sua sponte asked 
a revised question: "[I]s this the value that the jury believes should be paid for the 
shares?" (Tr. 989.) The value to be paid for Eggett's shares was not on the verdict form 
and is an entirely different question from the book value of the Company. Thus, Judge 
Young did not poll the jury as to the verdict question, but instead posed his own, 
misleading question. If the jury had been properly polled as to the actual Question 5 and 
had responded that the answer was not their verdict, then the court may have directed 
them to re-deliberate. But the court never gave the jury that chance. Instead, the court 
simply revised the question himself and coerced jury assent to his new question. (See Br. 
of App. 28-32.) 
Eggett also argues that "[o]nce the jury foreman told the trial Court that 
$135,671.96 was the book value to be 'paid for the shares,' . . . the error was patent and 
obvious." (Br. of Aplee. 35-36.) However, this argument begs the question of the court's 
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authority to question the jury in the first place. Absent a facial error or ambiguity in the 
verdict, the court had no business posing a revised question to the jury. In any event, the 
jury foreman's first response is consistent with the answer to Question 5: "We believe 
that [$135,672] to be the book value" (Tr. 990), presumably referring to the book value of 
Wasatch Energy, as the written question states. When the court elicits a further response 
with the words "And so—," the foreman adds, "Paid for the shares." {Id.) This second 
response, stated in the past tense, leaves unclear whose shares are referred to because 
neither Wasatch nor Eggett "paid" that amount for stock. The foreman did not say that 
the amount listed was "to be paid" as Eggett asserts. (Br. of Aplee. 30, 41.) This 
ambiguity did not justify further questioning, as the trial court cannot inquire into the 
jury's deliberations or mental processes and thereby create ambiguity as a pretext to alter 
the verdict to his own liking. Utah R. Evid. 606(b). 
In summary, nothing was "unclear" about Special Verdict Question 5. It asked for 
the "'book value' of Wasatch Energy," and the jury responded with the value of 
$135,672. Plaintiff, having approved the verdict form, was bound by that verdict, and the 
trial court erred by altering the question to change the meaning of the jury's answer. See, 
e.g., First Security Bank v. Ezra C. Lundahl, Inc., 454 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1969) ("when 
a party has demanded a trial by jury he is entitled to have the jury find the facts, and it is 
not the trial court's prerogative to make findings inconsistent therewith and thereby defeat 
the effect of the jury's findings"); EFCO Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, All P.2d 615, 617-
18 (Utah 1966) (unless error "is clearly shown," the "court should not upset a verdict 
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merely because it may disagree"); Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 152 P. 726, 
727 (Utah 1915) (trial court erred in refusing to enter judgment on jury's verdict and 
instead making findings of his own). 
B. Rule 47(r) Does Not Authorize Alteration of the Verdict. 
Eggett argues that the trial judge had discretion to alter the verdict question 
pursuant to Rule 47(r), Utah R. Civ. P. (Br. of Aplee. 34-41.) However, Eggett 
completely misconstrues the language and judicial application of Rule 47(r). 
Rule 47(r) states: 
If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be corrected 
by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
[Emp. added.] 
Eggett argues that the verdict was "informal" and "insufficient" because Judge Young 
considered the written question "confusing" and "ambiguous" and considered the answer 
a "mistake." (Br. of Aplee. 35.) However, as Wasatch has demonstrated, a special 
verdict question considered "confusing" or "ambiguous" must be corrected before 
submission to the jury or the objection is waived. Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a). (Br. of App. 22-
24.) Otherwise, any party dissatisfied with a verdict could argue after-the-fact to change 
- the verdict because the question was unclear and the jury could not have intended the 
answer it gave. Jury verdicts would be non-final and endlessly open to argument and 
conflicting evidence about what the jury understood and intended, contrary to the rules 
prohibiting such inquiry. Utah R. Evid. 606(b); see Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667 P.2d 598, 
603 (Utah 1983) (such evidence "is inadmissible as violative of the long-standing policy 
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against attempts to undermine the integrity of verdicts"). Moreover, perceived 
"mistakes" in a verdict that are not evident on the face of the verdict are not correctable 
through Rule 47(r)3 but are properly corrected by motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict or motion for new trial, neither of which was filed here. 
Long-established case law illustrates the meaning of an "informal or insufficient" 
verdict, a legal standard that appears in rules and statutes of many other states, as well as 
Utah. For example, in the leading case of Crowe v. Sacks, 283 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1955), the 
jury in an auto accident case returned a verdict for the two plaintiffs in the respective 
amounts of $2,500 and $3,000. The trial court, upon reading the verdict, expressed his 
opinion that the "verdict is grossly inadequate." A juror responded that it was a 
"compromise verdict," whereupon the court sent the jury out for further deliberation. Id. 
at 692. The jury later returned with a revised verdict in the increased amounts of $8,500 
and $11,000, and the court entered judgment on the revised verdict. Defense counsel 
objected that the verdict was complete and enforceable as first rendered, and that the 
court erred in requiring re-deliberation. Plaintiffs' counsel responded that the verdict was 
properly "corrected" as "informal or insufficient" under the rules of civil procedure. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by 
interfering with the jury's verdict. Construing the rule that corresponds to our Rule 47(r), 
the court defined an "informal' verdict as "defective in form; not in the usual form or 
manner; contrary to custom or prescribed rule." Id. The court defined an "insufficient" 
verdict as "inadequate for some need, purpose or use," as when it fails to "comprehend all 
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the issues submitted to the jury" or "goes beyond the issues of the case as stated in the 
instructions." Id. Cited examples are when the verdict exceeds a statutory maximum or 
includes improper items. The verdict in Crowe was not defective in form, and because "it 
comprehended all the items of damage contained in the instructions . . . , regardless of 
amount, it was not insufficient." Id. at 693 (emp. added). If the plaintiffs were 
dissatisfied with the amount of the verdict, their proper remedy was a motion for new 
trial. Id. Moreover, the trial court's statement that the verdict was inadequate, in effect, 
instructed the jury to return a larger verdict. "It was a clear invasion of the province of 
the jury to determine the amounts of damages to be awarded It was an unwarranted 
interference with the prerogative of the jury to determine the amounts." Id. at 694. The 
court concluded: 
The action of the judge in the correction of verdicts should be taken 
with caution. He must not throw the weight of his influence into the 
deliberations of the jury as to matters exclusively within its province.... 
s If the trial judge believes that the damages are inadequate, the proper 
procedure is to set the verdict aside on motion for new trial. [Id.] 
The leading Utah case construing Rule 47(r) cited and followed the definitions of 
"informal" and "insufficient" set forth in Crowe v. Sacks. See Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 
P.2d 934, 935 n. 1 (Utah 1963). In Jorgensen, the Utah Supreme Court held that a general 
damage verdict in the "odd amount" of $1,131.51 was properly questioned as a possible 
quotient verdict. The court directed the jury to reconsider, and the jury returned with a 
revised verdict in the round figure of $1,200. The Supreme Court upheld this procedure 
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only "where it is apparent that there is some patent error in connection with the verdict." 
Id. at 935 (emp. added). 
Subsequent Utah cases illustrate this limited scope of relief under Rule 47(r). In 
Brown v. Johnson, Ml P.2d 942 (Utah 1970), the court upheld correction of & special 
damage verdict in the amount of $10,000 because it exceeded the instructed limit of 
$377.50. Correction was justified because of "obvious error" "on the face" of the verdict. 
Id. at 945. Similarly, in Langton v. International Transport, Inc., 491 P.2d 1211 (Utah 
1971), a personal injury action, the court observed that the verdict was both "defective in 
form" and "insufficient" because the jury "obviously" failed to include amounts for pain 
and suffering and lost wages. Id. at 1214. The court distinguished such an "insufficient 
or informal verdict and a verdict regular on its face, which awards inadequate damages . . 
. . In the latter case, a new trial must be granted to correct the error." Id. at 1215 (emp. 
added). Because plaintiffs counsel failed to object to the obvious deficiencies in the 
verdict at the time it was rendered, relief under 47(r) was waived. Id. See also Ute-Cal 
Land Development Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1247-48 (Utah 1980) (verdict that 
found injury but awarded no damages contained "patent insufficiency" to which counsel 
was required to object to obtain relief under 47(r)); Stevenett v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
1999 UT App 80, 977 P.2d 508, 517 ("Rule 47(r) relates to the form of the verdict, not the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting it," emp. added; Rule does not apply to verdict 
regular on its face that is challenged for insufficiency of evidence); Cohn v. J.C Penney 
Co., 537 P.2d 306, 311 (Utah 1975) (personal injury verdict for plaintiff that awarded no 
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general damages was "deficient in form," but plaintiff waived the deficiency by failure to 
object).1 
Based on the foregoing case law, the jury's response to Special Verdict Question 5 
was not "informal or insufficient" within the meaning of Rule 47(r). The verdict plainly 
was not "informal" because it was not "defective in form." Neither Eggett nor Judge 
Young has suggested that the verdict was not in proper form. The verdict was not 
"insufficient" because it was completely adequate for its purpose and use, and it 
comprehended all the issues submitted to the jury. See Crowe and Jorgensen, supra. The 
verdict answered the "dispositive question" of the case, which was the book value of 
Wasatch Energy. See Sam's Texaco, supra. Moreover, as discussed above, the jury's 
number fell within the range of evidence presented by the parties. Certainly, the verdict 
contained no "obvious" or "patent" error to indicate that the jury had ignored instructions 
or had erroneously included, or failed to include, some element of damage in its 
calculation. This case is thus easily distinguished from Jorgensen, Langton, and Brown v. 
Johnson, relied upon by Eggett. Rather, the verdict here was "regular on its face'" and 
the only concern of Judge Young was the adequacy of the damage amount under his view 
of the evidence. Relief for inadequate damages under the evidence is obtained only by 
motion for new trial, not by sua sponte "correction" under Rule 47(r). See Crowe, 
1
 Cases from other jurisdictions are consistent in considering a verdict "informal or insufficient" only 
if it contains an obvious or patent error unrelated to adequacy of damages or sufficiency of evidence. 
See, e.g., State ex rel Sam's Texaco & Towing, Inc. v. Gallagher, 842 P.2d 383, 387-88 (Or. 1992) Qmy 
verdict that answers "dispositive question" " is sufficient even if other questions are not answered," and 
trial court "erred in refusing to accept it"). 
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Langton, and Stevenett, supra. Accordingly, Judge Young plainly erred in refusing to 
accept the jury's completed verdict and, instead, leading the jury to a higher damage 
award. Crowe v. Sacks, supra, at 694 (court's expressed opinion on inadequacy of verdict 
"was a clear invasion of the province of the jury"). 
C. The Trial Court's Error Was Not "Harmless." 
Eggett argues that any error by the trial court in questioning the jury and revising 
Question 5 to obtain a different result was "harmless" because the jury actually intended 
to award Eggett the full $135,672. (Br. of Aplee. 41-42.) In other words, a judge may 
ignore established rules and procedures, and even invade the province of the jury, as long 
as he achieves a "fair" result. This argument is not only wrong as a matter of law, it 
would, if approved by this Court, mark a drastic change and work untold mischief on the 
entire jury system. Judges would be free to inquire into every verdict to determine how it 
was reached, to verify jury intent, and to "correct" unintended or "unjust" results. The 
law forbids such judicial forays into the exclusive province of the jury. 
Rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
Upon inquiry into the validity of a verdict. . . , a juror may not 
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other 
juror's mind... as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the 
verdict... or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection 
therewith . . . . Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by 
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded 
from testifying be received for these purposes. [Emp. added.] 
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Accordingly, judicial inquiry into the jury's intent, deliberations, calculations, or mental 
processes, beyond the authorized polling of the jury as to its written verdict, is 
impermissible. Moreover, evidence that would be inadmissible by juror affidavit, such as 
the process by which damages were calculated, cannot be interjected by a party in 
circumvention of the rule. As clearly held in Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, supra: 
It is well settled that the only evidence admissible to impeach a jury 
verdict is that which demonstrates that the verdict was determined by 
chance or resulted from bribery. All other proof as to what was said or 
done in the jury room, including evidence that the jury was confused or that 
it misunderstood or disregarded the facts or the applicable law, is 
inadmissible as violative of the long-standing policy against attempts to 
undermine the integrity of verdicts. [667 P.2d at 603, emp. added, citations 
omitted.] 
Here, Eggett asserts that he knows how the jury calculated its verdict of 
$135,671.96, by adding one of his adjustments to the audited book value and then 
multiplying that figure by his 36.5 percent. Eggett concludes from this calculation that 
the jury must have intended to award him the full $135,671.96. (Br. of Aplee. 37.) 
However, because there is no record evidence of the jury's mental processes and 
calculations, Eggett's assertion remains inadmissible speculation. The Special Verdict 
form plainly asked the jury to determine the book value of Wasatch Energy (Add. 8), and 
the jury was clearly instructed to answer only the questions asked. "It is your duty to 
make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit to you." (Instruction 20, Tr. 919, 
emp. added.) The judge read and submitted Question 5, stating, "[W]hat was the book 
value of Wasatch Energy as defined by the shareholder agreement? And then there is a 
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line for you to place the value . . . . " (Tr. 927.) Accordingly, the jury was not asked, and 
was not authorized to answer, the different question regarding the book value of Eggett's 
shares. A jury is bound to answer the question asked, and courts are not permitted to 
speculate that the jury may have been answering a different question. Moreover, this 
Court cannot rely on Eggett's speculation of how the jury calculated its response to a 
question that was not asked, when that same evidence would be inadmissible from the 
jurors themselves. 
Eggett argues that alteration of the verdict was required to conform with actual 
juror intent. However, the intent of the law is to preserve the "integrity of verdicts," even 
though the jury may have been "confused," "misunderstood" the law, or even intended a 
different result. Groen, supra, at 603. For example, in Cooper v. Evans, 262 P.2d 278 
(Utah 1953), the jury found in a special verdict that the plaintiff had been contributorily 
negligent. As a result of this finding, the court entered judgment for defendants. When 
the court advised the jury of "the judgment required by their findings, several members of 
the jury voiced disapproval, claiming they had misunderstood; and that the result was not 
as they desired." Id. at 279. However, the court refused to change the verdict, despite 
juror "disappointment or even confusion." Id. The jury verdict was valid and binding 
even though the jury intended a different result and did not understand the legal 
consequences of its findings. Id. at 281. See also Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 
1321 (Utah App. 1988) (juror confusion as to effect of its finding does not invalidate 
verdict); State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972) Quror misunderstanding of law, 
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instructions, or effect of verdict, and the jury's "process of reasoning in arriving at a 
verdict," cannot be relied upon to challenge the verdict). 
Finally, the trial court's error was plainly prejudicial, as his changing of the verdict 
question, probing of the jury, and expression of his own opinions led to an increase in the 
verdict from $49,520 (36.5 percent of $135, 671.96) to the full $135,671.96. 
To clarify the actual sequence of events, Judge Young first read all the verdict 
questions and answers. (Tr. 988-89.) He then went back to Question 5 and asked the jury 
the revised, ambiguous question of whether $135,671.61 is "the value that the jury 
believes should be paid for the shares?" (Tr. 989.) The foreman responded, "We believe 
that to be the book value." (Tr. 990.) Judge Young then stated, "I think the question was 
confusing." (Id.) Denying the objection of defense counsel that the verdict should be 
enforced as asked and answered, Judge Young then opined that the answer was a 
"mistake." (Id.) The judge then asked a different question, whether the figure given is 
the amount owed to Mr. Eggett. Following the judge's lead, and apparently accepting the 
judge's opinion that the question was "confusing" and the answer a "mistake," the 
foreman answered, "Yes." (Id.) The judge rejected the objection of defense counsel that 
the verdict was phrased as discussed throughout the trial and opined that the jury did not 
intend the answer it gave. (Tr. 991.) Judge Young then "polled" the jury with a 
confusing, compound question, attempting to ask the jury if it calculated the $135,000 
from a larger number or intended to award Eggett a percentage of that figure. To that 
compound question, the jurors answered, "Yes," leaving their true intent unclear. (Tr. 
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991-93.) Judge Young then repeated that the written question was "ambiguous" and 
entered judgment for the full $135,671.96, even though the only verdict signed by the jury 
shows that amount as the book value of Wasatch Energy. (Tr. 993.) In denying a third 
objection of defense counsel, Judge Young concluded with his opinion that the written 
verdict was inadequate, as not supported by the evidence. (Tr. 994-95.) 
By this procedure, Judge Young plainly invaded the province of the jury; probed 
into its deliberations, calculations, intent, and mental processes; and carefully coerced the 
jury, with his own opinions of confusion and mistake, to the conclusion that Eggett was 
entitled to the full $135,000. The court's alteration of the verdict question plainly led the 
jury to a different result from what the verdict states, an action "inconsistent with 
substantial justice." Utah R. Civ. P. 61. Therefore, the error was prejudicial, and the 
court's action must be reversed. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
FOR CLAIMS NOT COVERED BY THE ATTORNEY FEE 
PROVISION. 
As Eggett concedes, the only attorney fee provision is found in the Shareholders' 
Agreement, authorizing fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce that agreement. 
(Br. of Aplee. 42.) The only claim based in that agreement is the claim for book value of 
Eggett's stock. Therefore, only those attorney fees incurred in pursuing the stock claim 
are recoverable. Fees incurred in pursuing the employment, compensation, and bad faith 
claims are not recoverable. 
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Eggett claims that he properly apportioned fees between the stock and other 
claims, but only for the time period prior to May 16, 1997. (Br. of Aplee. 44.) That was 
before this action was even commenced; moreover, that "apportionment" reduced 
claimed attorney fees by a mere $1,300. (Add. 84-85.) Wasatch is concerned about 
apportionment of the remaining $60,000 in attorney fees. Eggett makes the canned, 
conclusory assertion that the stock claim is "inextricably intertwined" with his other 
claims, but he points to no evidence or court findings to support the assertion. The truth 
is, as Wasatch demonstrated with record citations, the stock and compensation claims 
were treated separately throughout discovery and trial. (Br. of App. 36-37.) The amount 
claimed for stock under the Shareholders' Agreement is plainly distinct from the amount 
claimed for compensation under the Employment Agreement. Even if the two claims 
were considered related, they would still not be "inextricably intertwined" as to preclude 
apportionment. Certainly, if required, Eggett could separate his fees for the two different 
claims. Contrary to Eggett's statement of the law, recovery of fees for one claim does not 
automatically permit recovery of fees for all claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the judgment of the district 
court. Judgment for the book value of Eggett's stock should be limited to the agreed 
amount of $27,540, as set forth in the audited financial statement. Alternatively, 
judgment should be limited to $49,520, based on the written and signed jury verdict. If 
this Court does not enforce the Shareholders' Agreement, it should at least enforce the 
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jury verdict. In addition, the attorney fee award should be limited to the amount incurred 
in obtaining the book value of Eggett's stock. Finally, Wasatch should be awarded its 
attorney fees and costs incurred on this appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this. of September, 2000. 
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